State of Utah v. John Richard Kocher : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. John Richard Kocher : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Karen Stam; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Kocher, No. 981555 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1795




IN THE UTAH COURT Op APPEALS -* 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : UUftfcJ Nfl 9g/S.fX~^ 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER, : Case No. 981555-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), 
and Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (1993), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding. 
JOAN C. WATT (3967) 
KAREN STAM (1660) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM (1321) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of ADoeate 
JUN 2 3 19S9 
Julia O'Aleeandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE ST ATE OF I JT ? I I : 
Plaint i f f/Appe1lee, : 
: 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER : Case No. 981555 C i ! 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal fr^i a -Judgment ^t ^onvi -?t i on for Theft, a second 
degree * .* - .-
and Reckless driving, a c^ass .- rr.isdemeanoi , ::. " lo ia t ion of Uta 
Code Ann, f 4 : -^-4- '':?93 , • - - '-- ' ' ird J\ idicial Tis t r :cu Court 
ii l ai i i f• : i: ,S<= ] I: I i a k e Cc: n :i i i;t:> , State • : £ IJtal I the -cnciaL^e 
Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding. 
JAN GRAHAM (1321) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6t;h Floor 
?. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
JOAN C. WATT (3 967) 
KAREN STAM (166 0) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL
 D E F E N D E R ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appe] ] ant 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE THEFT COUNT REQUIRES REVERSAL WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE SALESMAN TO 
TESTIFY AS TO HIS OPINION REGARDING APPELLANT'S 
MENTAL STATE. 9 
CONCLUSION 20 
Addendum A: Judgment 
Addendum B: Text of relevant statutes and rules 
Addendum C: Portion of transcript preserving issue (R. 129:116, 
130-31) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 
1991) 16 
Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. 1992) 13 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982) 11, 12, 13 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 
1988) 19 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 16-17 
State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App. 1991) 15 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 3 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987) 12, 13 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 2 
State v. Kilburn, 52 P. 277 (Utah 1898) 12, 13 
State v. Lucero, 866 P. 2d 1 (Utah App. 1993) 2 
United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 (3d 
Cir. 1996) 3-4, 15, 
16 
United States v. Greene, 116 F.3d 1481 (6th 
Cir. 1997) 16 
United States v. Rea. 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 
1992) 15, 16 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 1, 4 
ii 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (e) (1996) 1 
Fed. R. Evid. 403 16 
Fed. R. Evid. 701 15, 16 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 16 
Fed. R. Evid. 704 Advisory Committee Note 16 
Former Utah R. Evid. 56 11 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a) (1) 2, 3 
Utah R. Evid. 701 1, 2, 3, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 
15, 16, 17, 
19 
Utah R. Evid. 704 1, 15, 17 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal 
Practice § 704.02, at Vll-63 (1989) 16 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER, : Case No. 981555-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (e) (1996). A copy of the judgment is contained in 
Addendum A. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes and rules are found in 
Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998); 
Utah Rule of Evidence 701; 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the theft conviction must be reversed where 
the trial judge admitted lay opinion testimony that Appellant's 
actions were deliberate? 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 129:116, 
13 0-31; see Addendum C containing portion of transcripts 
preserving issue. When the prosecutor asked the objectionable 
question, defense counsel objected, stating that it called for 
speculation. R. 129:116. Such an objection was sufficient to 
alert the judge to the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 701 that lay 
opinion must be (1) rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and (2) helpful. Since speculative testimony is not 
rationally based on the perception of a witness and is not 
helpful since it provides no further proof, defense counsel's 
objection preserved this issue. 
In addition, the record establishes that the trial judge was 
actually alerted to the rule 701 requirement and based his ruling 
on that rule of evidence. He stated his reason for the ruling on 
the record, pointing out that rule 701 requires that the witness' 
opinion be "rationally based on the perception of the witness and 
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or to 
[de]termination of a fact [in] issue," and concluded that 
Broadbent's testimony fit "squarely within that Rule 701." 
R. 129:130. Where the trial judge rules on a legal basis, the 
rationale for waiver rules no longer exists. See State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)(recognizing that "one of the 
primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 103(a)(1) is 
to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to 
address a claim that it erred. If the trial court has already 
had that opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver 
requirements is weakened considerably."). State v. Lucero, 866 
P.2d 1, 5 fn 3 (Utah App. 1993) ("trial court's consideration and 
ruling on the merits" preserved the issue). 
Moreover, Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) requires "[i]n case the 
ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
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strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of the 
objection, if the specific around was not apparent from the 
context... ." The error was apparent from the context, as 
evidenced by the trial judge's reference to Utah R. Evid. 701. 
In this case, defense counsel stated the specific objection, 
the trial judge actually ruled on the ground at issue in this 
appeal, and the specific ground was apparent from the context. 
Accordingly, the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) were met 
and this issue was properly preserved. 
Furthermore, even if the error was not properly preserved, 
it was plain error for the judge to admit the testimony. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (to establish plain 
error, appellant must show: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and the error is 
harmful... . " ) . The error was obvious since Utah R. Evid. 701 
was in effect and requires that opinion evidence be rationally 
based on a witness' perception and helpful to the jury. Since 
Broadbent's opinion was neither, Utah R. Evid. 701 precluded its 
admission. See discussion infra at 12-17. The error was 
prejudicial since intent was the only issue in this case, and 
absent this evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood the jury 
would have found that Kocher did not have an intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. See discussion 
infra at 17-19. 
Standard of Review. Federal courts have applied an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. See e.q. United States v. 
3 
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated November 5, 1997, the state charged 
Defendant/Appellant John Richard Kocher ("Kocher," "Appellant" or 
"Defendant") with Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404(1995), and Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 
1998). R. 1. A jury trial was held on June 9 and 10, 1998. 
R. 129. 
The trial judge instructed the jury on theft, a second 
degree felony, and the lesser included offense of theft of a 
motor vehicle, a third degree felony, and aggravated assault and 
the lesser included offense of reckless driving. R. 90, 92, 95, 
98. The jury convicted Kocher on Count 1, theft, a second degree 
felony, as charged in the Information and reckless driving, a 
lesser included class B misdemeanor. R. Ill, 112. The trial 
judge sentenced Kocher to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison and to concurrently serve six months on the reckless 
driving conviction. R. 111-12. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 29, 1997, at about 6:00 p.m., John Kocher asked some 
questions about a 1992 red Mitsubishi 3000GT sportscar at Brison 
Imports, 4659 South State, then test drove the car. R. 129:112-
113, 119, 121. The salesman, Robert Broadbent, accompanied 
Kocher on the test drive. R. 129:112-13. 
Broadbent takes all of his test drives on the same route. 
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R. 129:114-15. 
Broadbent: Just real quickly our test drives are all 
over the same route. We're on 46 [00] South State, we 
go up to 4500 South State, make a right turn, go up 7th 
East, make another right turn, go down to 480 0 South, 
make another right turn and come back to State, that's 
our standard procedure. 
R. 129:114-15. 
At 700 East, which is about the halfway point, Broadbent 
asked Kocher to turn right. R. 129:115. Kocher stayed in the 
center lane and continued without turning. R. 12 9:115. 
Broadbent said, "let's make a right turn at the next light." 
R. 129:127. Kocher acknowledged him, saying, "[o]kay, I must 
have missed the light." R. 129:127. 
Broadbent became "a little bit agitated" and told Kocher he 
"didn't have the time to drive all over and [he] needed to get 
back and to make a right turn at [900 East]." R. 129:115. 
Kocher turned right as directed and stopped at the stop sign at 
Vine Street. R. 129:115. 
Rather than turning right at Vine Street, which would have 
headed back towards the car lot, Kocher "drove straight ahead and 
stopped right in the middle of the road between both left and 
right oncoming traffic." R. 129:115. They were almost hit by 
cars coming from both directions. R. 129:125. 
Both Broadbent and Kocher were shaken up. R. 129:125. 
Broadbent asked Kocher to pull straight ahead, "get this thing 
off the road, ... and then we can regroup." R. 129:116. Kocher 
pulled onto a dead end street and got the car off the road. 
R. 129:124. Kocher was quiet and told Broadbent he was shaken up 
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and asked Broadbent to drive back. R. 129:116, 124. 
After Broadbent got out of the car, Kocher drove away. 
R. 129:117. Broadbent ran across the street to a residential 
area and used the telephone. About ten minutes later, while 
standing outside using a phone, Broadbent saw Kocher drive by 
again. R. 129:118. 
The next day, May 30, 1997, sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 
2:00 p.m., two men in a red sportscar arrived at Beehive RV 
Storage in Draper to rent a U-Haul. R. 129:134, 140. The 
manager of the storage units left the two by the U-Haul, telling 
them she had the wrong key, and went inside and called the police 
because the pair made her uncomfortable. R. 129:134, 140-41. 
At least four police officers responded in three police 
cars. R. 129:135. One of those officers was Deputy Cannon, who 
stood outside his vehicle talking with the manager. R. 129:136, 
147. The red car came back through the lot, around a corner. 
R. 129:138. The manager was standing fairly close to the police 
car and the red car when she noticed the red car. She yelled, 
"he's coming." R. 129:18. Deputy Cannon tried to stop the car 
by stepping around his vehicle and out in front of the red car, 
standing in the middle of the road, and extending his arm. 
R. 129:138-39, 148, 150. The red car sped up and as it rounded 
the corner, did not make any evasive movements to avoid the 
deputy. R. 129:138, 140, 149. The officer moved, and the car 
did not come closer than three feet to the officer. R. 129:142, 
149, 150. 
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Deputy Jones, who was also present, talked to the other 
suspect at the storage unit. R. 129:156. That person, Craig 
Neff, lived at a nearby trailer park. R. 129:157. The next day, 
Deputy Jones went to Neff's trailer and arrested Kocher, who was 
sleeping inside. R. 129:158, 159. When Jones arrested Kocher 
and asked about the Mitsubishi, Kocher initially denied having 
it. R. 129:161. While inside the trailer, Deputy Jones found 
the key to the Mitsubishi. R. 129:159. 
Later, as Deputy Jones was driving Kocher to jail, Kocher 
told him where the car was. R. 129:159. Kocher said the car was 
parked in an apartment complex in West Valley City. R. 129:159. 
While he would not talk to Deputy Peterson about the location of 
the car immediately after being arrested, Kocher told Deputy 
Peterson the car's location shortly thereafter, indicating that 
it was in an apartment complex parking lot on Redwood Road south 
of Callister's. R. 129:167. Peterson went to the two or three 
apartment complexes south of Callister's and recovered the car 
shortly after Kocher was arrested on May 31, 1997. R. 129:160. 
The car was in a guest parking lot with a blue car cover 
over it. R. 12 9:168. It did not appear to be damaged. 
R. 129:168. 
Barbara Kocher, Appellant's former wife, testified that 
Kocher telephoned her in late May 1997 and asked to come get the 
keys to a car he had test driven, then pick up the car and take 
it back. R. 129:171. Kocher was calling from a trailer house in 
Draper. R. 12 9:174. Kocher told her the car was in an apartment 
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complex next to Callister's. R. 129:176. There were only two 
apartment complexes and she figured it was one of them and would 
get more information when she picked up the keys. R. 12 9: 176-
77. Barbara's son was sick so she did not end up doing what 
Kocher requested. R. 129:171. The day after Kocher phoned, 
Barbara learned that he had been arrested. R. 129:172. 
When Kocher talked to Barbara about returning the car, he 
also told her that when he was driving the car, he had seen a man 
named Terry, and Kocher was afraid of Terry. R. 12 9:172. Kocher 
was worried Terry would kill or hurt him or Kocher's girlfriend, 
Stacey. R. 129:175. Barbara also testified that she had 
suspicions that Kocher was using methamphetamine during May 1997 
because he was acting differently, "was always on the go," and 
did not have time for his child. R. 129:173. 
Stacey Belgard, Kocher's fiancee testified that Kocher had 
told her he took off in the car because he had seen Terry and was 
frightened. R. 129:179-180. Terry had beaten up Stacey, held 
her for hours, raped her, and done other frightening things. 
R. 129:179, 182. 
Kocher had been awake for days, and using methamphetamine. 
R. 129:179. Methamphetamine made him think everyone was after 
him and he became incoherent. R. 12:179. 
Kocher telephoned Stacey and told her "that he was just 
freaking out and he was in a car and he'd just left the guy 
because Terry was coming after, he had a gun... ." R. 129:180. 
Kocher wanted her to go to the trailer. When she got there, 
8 
Kocher told her that while he was test driving a car, he had 
pulled over and had seen Terry and got scared and drove away. 
R. 129:181. They also talked about getting the car back to the 
dealership. Kocher told Stacey that he had talked to Barbara and 
that Barbara was on the way to get the keys to take the car back. 
R. 129:181. Kocher was arrested the next morning. R. 129:181. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah R. Evid. 701 has two requirements, both of which must 
be met in order to admit opinion testimony of a lay witness. The 
testimony must be (1) "rationally based on the perceptions of the 
witness" and (2) "helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in issue." The 
salesman's opinion that Appellant acted deliberately fit neither 
of these requirements and therefore was inadmissible under the 
rule. Because the error was harmful, a new trial is required. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE THEFT COUNT REQUIRES REVERSAL WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE SALESMAN TO TESTIFY 
AS TO HIS OPINION REGARDING APPELLANT'S MENTAL STATE. 
Robert Broadbent, the primary witness on the theft charge, 
testified that during the test drive, Kocher pulled into oncoming 
traffic and shortly thereafter, pulled over and asked Broadbent 
to drive. R. 12 9:115-16. After asking Broadbent whether Kocher 
appeared to be shaken up by pulling into traffic, the prosecutor 
asked, "[n]ow, you were with him, do you feel his actions were 
deliberate or accidental?" R. 129:116. Defense counsel 
objected, saying that the question called for speculation. 
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R. 129:116. The trial judge overruled the objection. 
R. 12 9:116. Broadbent responded that Kocher's actions were 
"deliberate because the observed driving before and after was 
what would be called acceptable." R. 129:116. 
Near the conclusion of Broadbent's testimony, the trial 
judge made a record of the basis for his ruling. R. 129:130. He 
stated: 
... let me just indicate that I didn't cite the rule 
that I intended to with respect to Ms. Stam's 
objection, the opinion testimony of a witness. Rule 
701 specifically allows a witness to testify in 
situations that the opinion is rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness testimony or to 
[de]termination of fact [in] issue. And it seems to me 
that his opinion as to accidental or determined is 
squarely within rule 701. I just wanted to state the 
reason for the ruling. 
R. 129:130. 
The next witness, the manager of the storage unit, testified 
regarding Count II, the charge of aggravated assault. After the 
manager testified regarding Kocher's actions in driving out of 
the storage unit parking lot, the prosecutor asked, "... do you 
have an opinion as to whether or not he deliberately aimed at the 
officer or whether it was accidental?" R. 129:140. Defense 
counsel objected that this presented a question for the jury. 
R. 129:140. Although this question was essentially identical to 
the one Broadbent was allowed to answer, the trial judge 
sustained this second objection, stating, "I'll sustain that 
objection. That is the ultimate fact for the jury to determine." 
R. 129:140. The jury concluded that Kocher's actions regarding 
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the incident charged in Count II did not amount to an intentional 
aggravated assault, and instead convicted him of the lesser 
reckless driving. 
In allowing Broadbent to testify that Kocher's actions were 
deliberate, the trial judge committed reversible error. Utah R. 
Evid. 701 states: 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the 
witness' testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in 
issue. 
Very few Utah cases have applied this rule or its 
predecessor. In Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982), the 
Court held that testimony of a mother as to gestation was 
admissible under former rule 56, Utah Rules of Evidence.1 The 
Court concluded in Roods that the mother's lay opinion was 
rationally based on her perception and MXhelpful to a clear 
understanding of (the) testimony or to the determination of the 
fact in issue.'" Roods, 645 P.2d at 642. It stated: 
With the noticeable physical discomfort and body 
changes attendant to pregnancy, the mother is in a 
position to observe the approximate length of her 
1
 Former Utah R. Evid. 56 was substantially similar to the 
current Utah R. Evid. 701. Rule 56 stated in pertinent part: 
TESTIMONY IN THE FORM OF OPINION. 
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inference is limited 
to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a) may 
be rationally based on the perception of the witness, and 
(b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony 
or to the determination of the fact in issue... . 
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pregnancy first hand. Certainly her estimation as to 
the period of gestation is both rationally based upon 
her perception and helpful to a clear understanding of 
the length of term of her child. Therefore, the trial 
court's admission of the mother's testimony on the 
subject of gestation was not error. 
Id. 
In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the Court held 
that the testimony of a lay witness that footprints outside and 
inside a house appeared to be the same was admissible under Utah 
R. Evid. 701. The Court reasoned that the testimony of the 
witness, a security guard, was based on his perception since he 
examined the footprints at the scene and later viewed photographs 
of them, and the testimony was helpful. Although the security 
guard's testimony was also "capable of scientific determination," 
"that does not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited if 
the provisions of the evidentiary rule are met." Id. at 191. 
In the present case, neither requirement of rule 701 was met 
and the testimony was therefore inadmissible. First, Broadbent's 
testimony was not "rationally based on the perception of the 
witness." While a witness is able to describe actions, gestures, 
facial expressions, and other observations, a witness cannot 
rationally ascertain the mental state of another. This notion 
that a witness can describe what he observed but cannot testify 
as to "what another person meant, or as to his intentions" is 
firmly rooted and was recognized in case law over a hundred years 
ago. See State v. Kilburn, 52 P. 277 (Utah 1898) . 
While an individual should know what his intentions 
were at any given time, and when competent, relevant, 
and material as evidence he may swear to them, other 
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persons can only know them from his outward 
expressions. The jury might infer what the defendant 
meant, or what his intentions were, from what he said 
or did or failed to do, but the witnesses could not 
give their inferences from them to the jury. 
Id. at 277; accord Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1104 (Ind. 
1992) . 
In contrast to Ellis, where the witness examined footprints 
then described them, and Roods, where the witness experienced the 
gestation period then described it, the witness in this case did 
not observe "deliberateness." Instead, Broadbent drew a 
conclusion from his observations and was allowed to tell the jury 
that conclusion. Additionally, nothing in the evidence suggested 
that Broadbent had any specialized knowledge or experience which 
would aid him in making this determination. 
Moreover, Broadbent was in the car with Kocher for only a 
short time. The beginning portion involved routine driving 
covering less than a mile. R. 129:115. After Kocher missed the 
turn on 7th East, Broadbent became upset and agitated and told 
Kocher that he "didn't have the time to drive all over and [he] 
needed to get back and to make a right turn at which he did, and 
stopped at a stop sign at Vine Street." R. 129:115. Immediately 
thereafter, Kocher committed the driving error which landed the 
car in the midst of oncoming traffic from two directions by 
pulling forward at Vine Street rather than turning. R. 12 9:115. 
Broadbent testified that, in his opinion, Kocher's driving up to 
the stop sign at Vine Street was acceptable. R. 129:115. 
Broadbent also testified that he was shaken up after the incident 
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and that he felt like Kocher probably was, too. R. 129:116. 
Prosecutor: Did he appear shook up? 
Broadbent: Well, his actions indicated that he 
probably should have been after pulling out in front of 
all the traffic so I accepted that as yes I was upset 
so I felt like probably he was so I was going to get 
out and drive. 
R. 129:116. 
Immediately after this passage indicating that Kocher was 
shaken up and "his actions indicated that he probably should have 
been," Broadbent speculated that Kocher's actions were deliberate 
because his driving was acceptable both before and after the 
incident. The testimony that the driving was acceptable after 
the incident conflicts with the above testimony. Moreover, 
Broadbent's opinion that the driving was "acceptable" was not 
itself an observation; indeed, Broadbent's testimony that Kocher 
did not turn at 7th East would suggest that the driving prior to 
the Vine Street incident was not acceptable. 
Under such circumstances, Broadbent was not in a position to 
testify as to Kocher's mental state, and his testimony that 
Kocher's actions were deliberate was not rationally based on his 
perceptions. Additionally, Broadbent's obvious irritation, fear 
and agitation interfered with his ability to assess whether 
Kocher's actions were deliberate. This failure to meet the 
requirement of subsection (a) that the testimony be rationally 
based on the witness' perceptions, standing alone precluded 
admission of Broadbent's testimony. 
The requirement of subsection (b) also was not met since the 
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testimony was not "helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in issue." 
Broadbent had already testified regarding Kocher's driving and 
Broadbent's belief that Kocher's driving appeared okay before the 
oncoming traffic incident. R. 129:116. The jury therefore had 
before it the information upon which Broadbent based his 
conclusion that Kocher acted deliberately. The jury, not 
Broadbent, should have made any appropriate findings. See 
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 at 250. 
In Anderskow, the Third Circuit concluded that a witness' 
subjective belief that the defendants "must have known" did not 
meet the "'helpfulness'" requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 
701(b) . Id. at 250.2 The Court pointed out that "where the 
jury has before it the same circumstantial evidence of a 
defendant's criminal knowledge on which a witness bases an 
opinion concerning a defendant's knowledge, testimony from a 
witness concluding that the defendant xhad to know' usually will 
not meet Rule 701 (b)'s helpfulness requirement... ." Id. 
(citing United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
[W]hen a witness has fully described what a defendant 
was in a position to observe, what the defendant was 
told, and what the defendant said or did, the witness' 
opinion as to the defendant's knowledge will often not 
be "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 because the 
jury will be in as good a position as the witness to 
draw the inference as to whether or not the defendant knew. 
2
 Utah R. Evid. 701 and 704 were adopted verbatim from the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal interpretations provide 
guidance in analyzing these rules. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986); State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
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Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 250 (quoting Rea, 958 P.2d at 1216); see 
crenerallv United States v. Greene, 116 F.3d 1481 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that "Rules 701 and 702 require that opinions be 
helpful to the jury to ensure that opinions that merely tell a 
jury what result to reach are not admitted"). 
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 704 
further clarifies that lay opinion testimony which goes to the 
ultimate issue in that it merely tells the jury what result to 
reach is not "helpful" to the jury and therefore is not 
admissible under rule 701. The Advisory Committee Note states: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower 
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, 
and Rule 4 03 provides for exclusion of evidence which 
wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances 
against the admission of opinions which would merely 
tell the jury what result to reach... . 
Fed. R. Evid. 704 Advisory Committee Note. 
This Court took a similar view in a footnote in Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1232 fn 7 (Utah App. 1991). This Court 
stated: 
Furthermore, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with 
the other rules of evidence. Thus, while [Rule 704] 
permits expert opinion testimony on an ultimate issue, 
Rule 704 does not mean that all opinions are admissible 
into evidence. Rules 701 and 702 require, 
respectively, that the opinions of lay and expert 
witnesses assist the trier of fact. And Rule 4 03 
provides for the exclusion of evidence which wastes 
time. Thus, if a witness's opinion will do little more 
than tell the jury what result to reach, it will be 
inadmissible. 
Id. (citing 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 704.02, at Vll-63 (1989)) (emphasis added); see also State v. 
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Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 547 (Utah App. 1998)(reiterating that 
"questions which would merely allow the witness to tell the jury 
what result to reach are not permitted"). 
Moreover, the plain language of rule 704 appears to bar lay 
witnesses from testifying as to the state of mind of the 
defendant. Rule 704 states: 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), 
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to 
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a 
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental 
state or condition constituting an element of the crime 
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues 
are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
This rule, particularly the last sentence, appears to 
preclude any witness, whether lay or expert from testifying as to 
the defendant's mental state since "[s]uch ultimate issues are 
matters for the trier of fact alone." 
Opinion testimony must meet both requirements of rule 701 in 
order to be admissible. In this case, where the opinion 
testimony met neither requirement because it was not rationally 
based on the perception of the witness and was not helpful to the 
jury, the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. 
The error in admitting Broadbent's testimony was harmful. 
Broadbent was the principal witness regarding the theft charge. 
The issue for the jury to decide on that charge was whether 
Kocher intended to permanently deprive the owner, intended to 
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temporarily deprive the owner, or had no intent to deprive. 
Broadbent's testimony went to the heart of this issue and 
essentially allowed him to act as additional juror, with the 
added weight that his determination was under oath and admitted 
as evidence. 
The evidence in this case showed that Kocher took the car 
while test driving it. In Broadbent's opinion, Kocher's driving 
was acceptable both before and after the oncoming traffic 
incident. The driving after the incident was very brief since 
Kocher was merely looking for a place to pull over to change 
drivers. R. 129:116, 124, 125. Additionally, Broadbent was 
upset and less likely to fully observe driving errors. 
R. 129:125. The driving prior to the incident was somewhat 
routine. R. 129:114-15. Moreover, Kocher made driving errors in 
failing to turn at 7th East and the stop sign. R. 129:115, 127. 
The jury may well have weighed the testimony regarding Kocher's 
driving and other actions differently than Broadbent and 
determined that it did not demonstrate deliberate actions or 
intent to permanently deprive. 
Indeed, Broadbent's testimony regarding his observations of 
Kocher's driving was susceptible to a determination that Kocher 
drove into oncoming traffic due to methamphetamine ingestion 
rather than deliberate conduct. The jury could have found that 
Kocher's failure to turn at 7th East and his significant driving 
error in pulling into traffic supported his defense that he was 
affected by methamphetamine and that when he later saw Terry 
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Lewis while pulled over to change drivers, Kocher became 
extremely frightened and drove off. Such a finding coupled with 
the evidence that Kocher attempted to make arrangements to return 
the car before he was arrested, would have supported a verdict of 
not guilty because Kocher did not have the intent to permanently 
deprive, or a verdict of guilty on the lesser charge because even 
if Kocher had the intent to deprive, such intent was only for 
temporary deprivation. 
Although the trial judge allowed Broadbent to testify that 
Kocher's actions were deliberate, he later refused to allow the 
manager of the storage units to answer a similar question as to 
whether Kocher7s actions in driving toward the officer were 
deliberate. R. 12 9:140. On that count, the jury convicted 
Kocher of reckless driving rather than intentional aggravated 
assault. This underscores the importance of Broadbent's 
testimony that Kocher's actions were deliberate. In this case 
where plausible evidence existed which supported acquittal or 
conviction on a lesser included offense, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result had the trial judge not 
erred in admitting the testimony. See generally State v. 
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 194 (Utah App. 1988) (an error is harmful 
requiring reversal if there is a reasonable likelihood it 
affected the outcome). 
Because rule 701 precluded admission of Broadbent's opinion 
testimony, the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing 
Broadbent to state his opinion. The prejudicial nature of that 
19 
error requires reversal of Kocher's conviction for theft. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant John Richard Kocher respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this 33AJL day of June, 1999. 
C&*^- ufcw 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
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PRESENT 
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Prosecutor: STEVE MERCER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN STAM 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 28, 1969 
Audio 
Tape Number: 98170 Tape Count: 5430 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 06/10/1998 {Guilty - Jury} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 971000782 
Date: Jul 23, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SENTENCED WITHOUT A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. 
II TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH COUNT I. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COUNT 
THE COURT RECOMMENDS THEAT DEFENDANT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER INTO 
MENTAL HEALTH AND DRUG COUNSELING. THE COURT RECOMMENDS CREDIT FOR 
TIME SERVED FOR JAIL TIME SERVED (218 DAYS). DEFENDANT WAS 
SENTENCED WITHOUT A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECKLESS DRIVING a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
Dated this 23 day of 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a 
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, 
and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of 
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the 
control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different 
person. 
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unlawful control; or 
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing 
the offense: 
(i) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in an 
amount of $500 or more; 
(ii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is used to commit a 
felony; or 
(iii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in any 
amount to facilitate entry into it or its operation. 
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the 
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer within 24 hours. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition 
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 




























car. Did he eventually move the car? 
A He did pull straight ahead into a residential 
area, I think the sign says Dead End, but it went for about 
a block, turned right at a stop sign, and that's where he 
said he was too shook up, needed me to drive back to which I 
was more than happy to do. 
Q Okay, so he at that time asked you if you would 
drive back? 
A He did. 
Q Did he appear to be shook up? 
A Well, his actions indicated that he probably 
should have been after pulling out in front of all the 
traffic so I accepted that as yes I was upset so I felt like 
he probably would be and he was so I was going to get out 
and drive. 
Q Okay. Now you were with him, did you feel that 
his actions were deliberate or accidental? 
MS. STAM: Well, Your Honor, that kind of calls 
for a speculation. I'm going to object to that. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection and let 
the witness answer. 
THE WITNESS: Well, as I looked back upon it I 
would say it was deliberate because the observed driving 
before and after was what would be called acceptable. 



























Q BY MR. MACK: Do you remember before the test 
drive, I guess as part of the 10 minute conversation, 
something to the effect of there having been an engine 
replaced in the car or some necessity to jump start that car 
before you could test drive it? 
A If I recall the battery was low. We did jump it 
to start it, jumped the battery, uh-huh. 
Q All right. So that would have been, that could 
have been some of the other conversation that filled the 10 
minutes? 
A Perhaps. 
MR. MACK: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you have other questions for this 
witness, Ms. Mann? 
MS. MANN: Just a couple, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: While you're walking up let me just 
indicate that I didn't cite the rule that I intended to with 
respect to Ms. Stam's objection, the opinion testimony of 
the witness. Rule 701 specifically allows a witness to 
testify in situations that the opinion is rationally based 
on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness testimony or to termination of 
fact an issue. And it seems to me that his opinion as to 
accidental or determined is squarely within that Rule 701. 









1 I  with your question then. 
2 8 MS. MANN: Thank you, Judge. 
3 
4 | REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
5
 [ BY US, MANN; 
Q Now, you stated this car can accelerate fast, it 
will accelerate fast. 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q When the defendant drove away from you and when 
you saw him driving back past you, did you hear the tires 
squeal? 
A I don't recall, no. 
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 Q Did it appear that he was accelerating at an 
1 4
 excessive speed? 
-^ A The first time when he departed he departed 
16
 I promptly, promptly is all I'm going to say. 
Q Okay. 
18 || A Did not appear to be calling attention to 
19 squealing tires or anything. He just departed promptly, 
20 went up to Vine Street and made a left turn and disappeared. 
21 The next time that he came around when I was on the 
22 telephone it was just driving up the street in what appeared 
23 to be a very normal fashion like maybe 30 miles an hour, not 
24 even going anywhere in a hurry. 
25 Q So he just normally drove right back past the same 
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